Tank Battlefield reliability in WW2

You can have the most devastating tank on the battlefield. You can have 100 of them – but if they don’t reach the battlefield, then they are, for all practical purposes, useless. Tanks in the late 1930s were in the process of continual development. Better engines, better tracks, better suspension, heavier armor, and better armament.

From the start of World War II, the speed of development increased significantly, as did the inherent engineering problems…

The technical manual issued to King Tiger crews began with the inspiring introduction, «Congratulations! You are a crew member of the finest tank in the world. Until you run out of fuel. Then you are a crew member of the finest pillbox in the world. Until you run out of ammunition,. Then you have the finest coffin in the world.» No mention of breakdowns.

While a lack of fuel and ammunition was not uncommon throughout the war for all sides, mechanical breakdowns were a frequent, if not daily, occurrence. There are widely differing views on the relative reliability of tanks on all sides. From mostly transmission issues on early-war Soviet tanks to late-war suspension issues with German heavy tanks,. Certain tanks gained notoriety (such as the KVs and Panther A) but overall it was often three factors that really affected performance: 

1. Traveling long distances without suitable chances to perform routine maintenance 
2. Lack of training of crews and suitable maintenance support teams
3. Lack of equipment, spares, and recovery equipment

Traveling long distances without suitable chances to perform routine maintenance

Whether advancing or retreating, tanks were generally not capable of covering significant distances over a long period of time. Here we are talking about 30 miles (50 Km) a day and/or in combat day after day without a chance for essential & standard maintenance. Coupled to distance climactic and terrain factors can take their toll. From the high temperatures & inhospitable terrain of the North African Desert to the torrid snowy wastes and freezing temperatures of the Soviet winter, all affect serviceability. A lack of standard maintenance results in more serious issues that can cause a vehicle to become immobile and either abandoned, towed or transported to field workshops.

The first time that the Wehrmacht came across any significant issues was in the invasion of the Balkans where poor road quality meant excessive breakdowns, however, with relatively few losses and a short campaign duration, serviceability was recovered quickly (often by transporting said tanks by rail back to Germany).

The next two campaigns, however, caused serious issues, not only due to serious losses due to enemy fire & mines and therefore ‘battle damage’ but also excessive wear & tear due to terrain and distances covered exacerbated by relatively poor supply. The Germans, of course, adapted by increasing the already significant support units and decentralizing their organisation. These campaigns were North Africa and the invasion of the Soviet Union.

However, it was identified by the Germans themselves that Hitler’s drive for greater tank production, rather than spare parts for existing ones was actually hampering tank strengths in the latter part of WW2. Notwithstanding this, during the last 10 months before the effective collapse of Germany, the operation rates for their main battle tanks were all over 65% and varied little from front to front.

• Pz IV = 71%
• Panther = 66.5%
• Tiger II = 70.5%

These rates had degraded since Kursk where an overall rate of 89% was achieved. No matter what these figures actually specifically relate to we can see that there was a drop in maintenance ability, and spare parts, and as tanks got fewer they had an ever greater workload, thus compounding the problem. During the Battle for Berlin, the 12 Tiger II tanks present 11 remained operational.

Lack of training of crews and suitable maintenance support teams

• Poor training or replacement crews and the rapid expansion of Soviet Armoured Formations (as well as shoddy workmanship in the factories) led to unnecessary maintenance issues within units. This was partly mitigated by huge numbers of replacement vehicles and an anticipated short life expectancy for each tank. As relative losses reduced and crew experience increased things started to improve. The maintenance schedule for a T34 has it’s own separate page.
• The Wehrmacht maintenance support was well organized and efficient until the last few months of the war, however, crew quality did diminish in as far as general training and that would have some small deterioration in maintenance skills until the experience was gained.
• Allied Formations, which were generally not as evolved as the German organisations, though equally as competent, did manage to maintain a reasonable standard and this, coupled with production quality & quantity (once the United States entered the War) ensured that their Armoured units (operating at relatively short distances after North Africa) were kept up to strength.
• American maintenance teams tended not to be trained in some vital areas of relatively routine minor repair work to the extent that by the time of their arrival on the German border in the autumn of 1944 many had no functioning radios…. this was remedied by simple instructions from members of the British Army’s REME.

Lack of equipment, spares and recovery equipment

• Guderian commented to Hitler, on his return to active service as Inspector General of Armoured Troops in 1943 that there should be more emphasis on recovery vehicles to ensure that an often withdrawing German Army could take its wounded tanks with it. That coupled with a stretched supply network (even in 1943) on the Eastern Front made maintaining levels of serviceable tanks on the front line very difficult – the only mitigating factor was that the Germans were moving ever closer to their production centres.
• The British in the Desert had similar problems with a hideously long supply line (via South Africa)coupled with a plethora of different models of tanks (A9/A10/A13/Matilda II/Crusader I/Crusader II/Crusader III/Stuart/Grant/Valentine/Sherman/Churchill) over the campaign. Once North Africa was in Allied hands and the invasion of Italy had begun the supply situation improved somewhat (though it had got a great deal simpler for the enemy as well) as the tank models had reduced to only a few different models and the sea route shortened as it was now via Malta.
• From D-Day onwards the Allies had committed vast forces to the Continent and supplying these troops for all eventualities was a difficult was not always possible until a major serviceable port was gained, and the supply situation improved.
• The Soviets, always short of transport, generally kept their supply systems simple and so had similar issues to the other combatants.
• Significantly the Americans, British, Germans & Japanese all had Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs) during WW2 whilst the Soviets did not.
• Whilst the British Army led the way in Tank Transporters the Americans and Germans also had them in WW2. No other country used them.

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